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Abstract—In this paper we analyze different biometric
authentication protocols considering an internal adversary. Our
contribution takes place at two levels. On the one hand, we
introduce a new comprehensive framework that encompasses
the various schemes we want to look at. On the other hand,
we exhibit actual attacks on recent schemes such as those
introduced at ACISP 2007, ACISP 2008, and SPIE 2010, and
some others. We follow a blackbox approach in which we
consider components that perform operations on the biometric
data they contain and where only the input/output behavior of
these components is analyzed.
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protocols, blackbox security model, malicious adversaries
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH biometric template protection is a relativelyyoung discipline, already over a decade of research has
brought many proposals. Methods to secure biometric data can
be separated in three levels. The first one is to have biometric
data coming in a self-protected form. Many algorithms have
been proposed: quantization schemes [1], [2] for continuous
biometrics; fuzzy extractors [3] and other fuzzy schemes [4]–
[6] for discrete biometrics; and cancellable biometrics [7]–
[9]. The security of such template-level protection has been
intensively analyzed, e.g., in [10]–[13]. On a second level one
can use hardware to obtain secure systems, e.g., [14], [15].
Finally, at a third level advanced protocols can be developed
to achieve biometric authentication protocols relying on ad-
vanced cryptographic techniques such as Secure Multiparty
Computation, homomorphic encryption or Private Information
Retrieval protocols [16, Ch. 9] [17]–[24].
The focus of our work is on this third level. In this work,
we analyze and attack some existing biometric authentication
protocols. We follow [25] where an attack against a hardware-
assisted secure architecture [15] is described. The work of
[25] introduces a blackbox model that is taken back and
extended here. In this blackbox model, internal adversaries
are considered. These adversaries can interact with the system
by using available input/output of the different functionalities.
Moreover, the adversaries are malicious in the sense that they
can deviate from the honest-but-curious classical behaviour,
which is most often assumed.
Our contributions are the following. We extend the blackbox
framework initiated in [25] with the distributed system model
of [19] in a way that it can handle different existing proposals
for biometric authentication. We show how this blackbox
approach can lead to attacks against these proposals. We
describe in detail our analysis of three existing protocols [19],
[20], [22] and give arguments on some others [23], [24]. In the
framework we propose, we study how the previous attacks can
be formalized. We list all the possible existing attacks points
and the different internal entities that can lead the attacks, and
we reveal the potential consequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The framework
is developed in Section II and introduces the system and attack
model. This is then applied to existing protocols in Section III,
where detailed attacks are described. Section IV formalizes
these attacks and Section V concludes the paper.
II. FRAMEWORK
In this section we present a framework that forms a basis
for the security analysis of biometric authentication protocols.
The framework models a generic distributed biometric system
and the (internal) adversaries against such system. We define
the roles of the different entities that are involved and their
potential attack goals. From these roles and attack goals we
derive the requirements that are imposed on the data that are
exchanged between the entities.
Biometric Notation: Two measurements of the same
biometric characteristic are never exactly the same. Because
of this behavior, a biometric characteristic is modeled as a
random variable B, with distribution pB over some range B.
A sample is denoted as b. Two samples or templates are related
if they originate from the same characteristic. In practice, we
will say they are related if their mutual distance is less than
some threshold. Therefore, a distance function d is defined
over B and for each value in the range of d that is used as
the threshold when comparing two samples a false match rate
(FMR) and a false non-match rate (FNMR) can be derived.
Biometric variables can be continuous or discrete but in the
remainder of the paper we will assume that they are discrete.
Note that the variables may consist of multiple components.
For example, a sample may consist of a bitstring, which is the
quantized version of a feature vector, and an other bitstring
that indicates erasures or unreliable components in the first
and thus act as a mask.
A. System Model
Our system model follows to a large extent the model
defined by Bringer et al. [19], which was also used to define
new schemes in [20] and [26]. This model is motivated by
2a separation-of-duties principle: the different roles for data
processing or data storage on a server are separated into three
distinct entities. Using distributed entities is a baseline to avoid
one to control all information and it is a realistic representation
of how current biometric systems work in practice (cf. [27]).
System Entities: The different entities involved in the
system are a user Ui, a sensor S, an authentication server
AS , a database DB and a matcher M. User Ui wishes to
authenticate to a particular service and has, therefore, regis-
tered his biometric data bi during the enrollment procedure.
In the context of the service the user has been assigned an
identifier IDi, which only has meaning within this context.
The biometric reference data bi are stored by DB, who links
the data to identifier i. The mapping from IDi to i is only
known by AS, if relevant. Note that in some applications it is
possible that the same user is registered for the same service
or in the same database with different samples, bi and bj , and
different identities, i.e., IDi 6= IDj in the service context or
i 6= j in the database context. The property of not being able
to relate queries under these different identities is the identity
privacy requirement as defined in [19].
During the authentication procedure the sensor S captures
a fresh biometric sample b′i from user Ui and forwards
the sample to AS . The authentication server AS manages
authorizations and controls access to the service. To make
the authorization decision, AS will rely on the result of the
biometric verification or identification procedure that is carried
out by the matcher M. It is assumed that there is no direct
link between M and DB. As such, AS requests from DB
the reference data that are needed by M and forwards them
to M. It is further assumed that the system accepts only
biometric credentials. This means that the user provides his
biometric data and possibly his identity, but no user-specific
key, password or token. Fig. 1 shows the participating entities.
Functional Requirements: Enrollment often involves off-
line procedures, like identity checks, and is typically carried
out under supervision of a security officer. Therefore, we
assume that users are enrolled properly and only authentication
procedures are analyzed in our framework. A distinction has
to be made between verification and identification. Verification
introduces a selection step, which implies that DB returns
only one of its references, namely the bi that corresponds to
the identifier i that is used in the context of the database.
The entity that does the mapping between IDi and i, when
applicable, is generallyAS. In identification mode,DB returns
the entire set of references, in some protected form, to AS.
The database can then be combined with b′i and forwarded to
M. The matcher M has to verify that b′i matches with one
or a limited number of bi in the received set of references or
that one of the matching references has index i.
We define the minimal logical functionality to be provided
by our system entities in terms of generic information flows,
which are included in our model in Fig. 1. In this functional
model, we represent the result of the biometric comparison as a
function of the distance d(b′i, bi). This is a generic representa-
tion of the actual comparison method: M can evaluate simple
distances but also run more complex comparisons and will
output either similarity measures or decisions that are based
on some threshold t. The information flows are as follows.
User Ui presents a biometric characteristic Bi that will
be sampled by the sensor S to produce a sample b′i. When
operating in verification mode Ui will claim an identity IDi :
Ui
b′i←Bi−−−−→ S or Ui
b′i←Bi , IDi−−−−−−−→ S . (1)
The sensor S forwards b′i and IDi in some form to AS:
S
f1(b
′
i)−−−−→ AS or S
f1(b
′
i) , g1(IDi)−−−−−−−−−→ AS . (2)
In general g1(IDi) = IDi but it can also be a mapping to
an encrypted value to hide IDi from AS. If applicable AS
resolves the mapping g1(IDi) to the identifier i and requests
reference data for one or more users from DB by sending at
least one request g2(b′i, i) :
AS
g2(b
′
i,i)−−−−−→ DB . (3)
Note that the function g2 does not necessarily use all the
information in its arguments, e.g., the fresh sample b′i may
be ignored.
Database DB provides AS with reference data for one or
more users in some form. It is possible that DB returns the
entire database, e.g., in case of identification:
AS
f2({bi})
←−−−−− DB . (4)
The authentication server AS forwards the fresh sample b′i
and the reference data bi in some combined form to M :
AS
f3(b
′
i,{bi})−−−−−−−→M . (5)
Note that AS has only f1(b′i) and f2(bi) at his disposal to
compute f3(b′i, {bi}) .
The matcherM performs a biometric comparison procedure
on the received b′i and {bi} and returns the result to AS . The
result may contain decisions or scores or different identities but
should at least be based on one distance calculation between
the fresh sample b′i and a reference bi :
AS
f4(d(b′i,{bi}))←−−−−−−−−M . (6)
Different data are stored by the different entities. The
database stores references {bi}. The authentication service
stores the information needed to map g1(IDi) to i, if appli-
cable. The matchers can store non-biometric verification data,
e.g., hashes of keys extracted from biometrics, or decryption
keys that are use to recover the result of combining sample and
reference. Also, the sensor can store key material to encrypt
the fresh sample.
B. Adversary Model
Attacker Classification: Based on the physical entry point
of an attack a distinction is made between two types of
attackers: internal attackers are corrupted components in the
system and external attackers are entities that only have access
to a communication channel. We will consider here only the
issue of an insider attacker. As a baseline, we make the
following assumption.
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M
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′
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′
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Fig. 1. System model with indication of generic information flows and attack points Ai. User Ui’s biometric is sampled by sensor S . The sample b′i
and Ui’s identity are forwarded to the authentication server AS , who requests the corresponding reference bi from database DB. AS combines the sample
and the reference and forwards the result to matcher M, who performs the actual comparison and returns the result to AS . The solid arrows represent the
messages exchanged between the system entities. The dashed arrow represents the implicit feedback on the authentication result to the user Ui, i.e., access
to the requested service is granted if the sample matches the reference.
Assumption 1: The protocol ensures the security of the
scheme against any external attacker.
As this can be reached by classical secure channel techniques,
by an external security layer independent of the core protocol
specification, we study further only the internal layer. Note that
the security of the scheme needs to be expressed in terms of
specific attack goals, which will be defined in the next section.
A second distinction is made based on an attacker’s capa-
bilities. Passive attackers or honest-but-curious attackers are
attackers that only eavesdrop the communications in which
they are involved and that can only observe the data that passes
through them. They always follow the protocol specifications,
never change messages and never generate additional commu-
nication. Active or malicious attackers are internal components
that can also modify existing or real transactions passing
through them and that can generate additional messages. We
mainly focus on malicious internal attackers and we formulate
the following additional assumption.
Assumption 2: The protocol ensures the security of the
scheme against honest-but-curious entities, i.e. internal system
components that always follow the protocol specifications but
eavesdrop internal communication.
We will explain in Section II-C how this has a direct impact
on the properties of the different functionalities of our model.
Finally, we put aside the threats on the user or client side, by
concentrating the analysis on the remote server’s side, i.e., AS,
DB or M. The information leakage for the user and the client
is generally only the authentication or identification result.
They can, however, try to gain knowledge on the reference
data bi by running queries with different b′i, e.g., in some
kind of hill climbing attack. The difficulty can highly vary
depending on the modalities, the threshold and the scenario.
A basic line of defense is to limit the number of requests, to
ensure the aliveness of the biometric inputs provided by the
user and to hide the result when applicable. Although it is
important to implement such defense mechanisms, the threats
are inherent to any biometric authentication or identification
system. So we do not take the user or the sensor into account
as an attacker in this model and the primary attack points are
AS , DB and M. Nonetheless, there may be inside attackers
that also control the biometric inputs to some extent. We model
this with a secondary attack point at the sensor.
Assumption 3: The user Ui or the sensor S cannot be
attackers on their own but they can act as a secondary attack
point in combination with a primary attack point at AS , DB
or M. If this the case an attacker can choose the input sample
b′i through S and observe whether the authentication request
was successful through Ui.
Of course, the baseline assumptions have to be checked
before proceeding with a full analysis of the security of a
scheme, but as such, they clarify what the big issues are that
may remain in state-of-the-art schemes. They also underline
what the hardest challenges are when designing a secure
biometric authentication protocol. Fig. 1 sums up the different
attack points we consider in our attack model.
Attack Goals: As noted above, the security of a scheme
is expressed in terms of specific attack goals or adversary
objectives. Therefore, we define the following global attack
goals.
• Learn reference bi . In accordance to the security
definitions in [25] we define different gradations in the
information that an attacker may want to learn from bi.
Minimum leakage refers to the minimum information that
allows, e.g., linking of references with high probability.
Authorization leakage is the information that is needed
to construct a sample that is within distance t, the system
threshold, of the reference bi. Full leakage gives full
knowledge of bi. When a scheme is resistant to this attack
in all three gradations we say that it provides biometric
reference privacy.
• Learn sample b′i . The same gradations apply as in
the previous attack goal. We call the security property
associated with this attack goal biometric sample privacy.
• Trace users with different identities. This attack can
be achieved when different references from the same
user, possibly coming from different applications, can be
4TABLE I
RELEVANCE OF ATTACK GOALS FOR DIFFERENT (MALICIOUS) ENTITIES IN
THE SYSTEM MODEL (? = ONLY RELEVANT IF THE SCHEME UNDER
CONSIDERATION WAS DESIGNED TO HIDE REFERENCES FROM DB; * =
ONLY RELEVANT IF THE PROTOCOL OPERATES IN IDENTIFICATION MODE
OR IF IDi AND i ARE HIDDEN FROM AS IN VERIFICATION MODE).
Attack goal AS DB M
Learn bi V ? V
Learn b′
i
V V V
Trace Ui with different identities V ? V
Trace Ui over different queries V* V V
linked. A system that is resistant to such attack is said to
provide identity privacy [26].
• Trace users over different queries. This attack refers
to linking queries, whether anonymized or not, based on
i, bi or b
′
i. The property of a system that prevents such
attack is called transaction anonymity [26]. Note that an
attacker that is able to learn b′i can automatically trace
users based on the learned sample.
The formulated attack goals may apply to the different
internal attackers as indicated by the different attack points.
The relevance of the attack goals is shown in TABLE I. Attack
goals can be generalized for combinations of inside attackers,
e.g., AS and M. They are relevant for the combination if they
are relevant for each attacker individually. As a counterexam-
ple, learning bi is not always relevant for the combination AS-
DB. In some schemes it is assumed that DB stores references
in the clear so the attack “learn bi” becomes trivial. It is
important, however, that such schemes explicitly mention the
assumption that DB is fully trusted. It will become clear in
the further sections that the main focus of our work is on AS
who is a powerful attacker. This way of thinking is rather new
and many protocols are not designed to be resistant to such
attacker.
For each attacker or combination of attackers, and for each
relevant attack goal a security requirement can be defined,
namely that the average success probability of the given
attacker that mounts the given attack on the scheme should
be negligible in terms of some security parameter defined
by the application. When analyzing the security of biometric
authentication protocols that include distributed entities, each
of these requirements should be checked individually.
C. Requirements on Data Flows
Coming back to the functionalities in our system model (cf.
Section II-A), we use the attack goals defined in TABLE I to
impose requirements on the data that are being exchanged.
• AS should not be able to learn b′i hence f1 is at least
one-way, meaning that b′i should be unrecoverable from
f1(b
′
i) with overwhelming probability. To prevent tracing
Ui over different queries, e.g., in identification mode, it
could also be required that f1 is semantically secure. We
note that semantic security is a security notion that might
be too strong but it ensures that the function prevents the
minimum leakage as described under attack goal learn bi
(Section II-B).
• AS should not learn bi hence f2 is at least one-way. To
prevent tracing users with different identities it may be
required that f2 is also semantically secure.
• If applicable,AS should not be able to trace Ui by linking
queries on IDi or i, and thus g1 should be semantically
secure.
• If applicable, DB may not learn bi, hence the bi would
need to be stored in protected form using some semanti-
cally secure function.
• DB may not learn b′i, hence g2 is one-way on its first
input. It should also be semantically secure to prevent
tracing Ui.
• DB may not be able to link the queries at all, hence g2
should also be semantically secure on its second input.
• M may not learn the individual bi or b′i and must not
be able to link references or queries from the same Ui,
hence f3 should be semantically secure on tuples 〈b′i, bj〉
Now as we demand that M returns a result to AS that
is a function (f4) of the distance d(b′i, bi) while maintaining
the confidentiality and the privacy of the data, this means that
some operations must be malleable. Malleability refers to the
property of some cryptosystems that an attacker can modify a
ciphertext into another valid ciphertext that is the encryption of
some function of the original message, but without the attacker
knowing this message. Depending on the exact step when the
combination of bi and b′i is realized, either g2, f2 or f3 would
be malleable. In the following section, we will show the impact
of this fundamental limitation and how it can be exploited to
attack existing protocols.
III. APPLICATION TO EXISTING CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we begin to extend attacks that have been
introduced by Bringer et al. in [25] in the context of hardware
security to more complex cryptographic protocols that use
homomorphic encryption in Section III-A for a scheme by
Bringer et al. [19] and in Section III-B for a scheme by
Barbosa et al. [20]. We then describe another kind of attacks
by looking at a scheme by Stoianov [22] in Section III-C.
Finally, we briefly discuss attacks on two other schemes [23],
[24] in Section III-D. All schemes are described with the goal
to fit them directly into our model.
A. Bringer et al. ACISP 2007
1) Description: In [19], Bringer et al. presented a new
security model for biometric authentication protocols that
separates the tasks of comparing, storing and authorizing an
authentication request amongst different entities: a fully trusted
sensor S, an authentication server AS , a database DB and
a matching service M. The goal was to prevent any of the
latter three to learn the relation between some identity and the
biometric features that relate to it. Their model forms the basis
of our current framework and in this model they presented a
scheme that applies the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [28].
Let EGM and DGM denote encryption and decryption, respec-
tively, and note that for any m,m′ ∈ {0, 1} we have the ho-
momorphic property DGM(EGM(m, pk)× EGM(m′, pk), sk) =
m⊕m′. The scheme in [19] goes as follows.
5During the enrollment phase, the user Ui registers at the
authentication server AS . He then gets an index i and a
pseudonym IDi. Let N denote the total number of records
in the system. Database DB receives and stores (bi, i) where
bi stands for Ui’s biometric template, a binary vector of
dimension M , i.e., bi = (bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,M ). In the following,
we suppose that i is also the index of the record bi in the
database DB.
A key pair is generated for the system. Matcher M pos-
sesses the secret key sk. The public key pk is known by S,
AS and DB. The authentication server AS stores a table of
relations (IDi, i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Database DB contains
the enrolled biometric data b1, . . . , bN
When user Ui wants to authenticate himself, the S will
send an encrypted sample EGM(b′i, pk) and IDi to AS. The
authentication server AS will request the encrypted reference
EGM(bi, pk) from DB and combine it with the encrypted
sample. Because of the homomorphic property, AS is able
to obtain EGM(b′i⊕ bi, pk). Note that the encryption is bitwise
so AS will permute the M encryptions and forward these to
M. Because M has the secret key sk, M can decrypt the
permuted XOR-ed bits and compute the Hamming distance
between the sample and the reference.
The security of this protocol is proved in [19] under the
assumption that all the entities in the system will not collude
and are honest-but-curious. It is this assumption that we
challenge in our framework, which leads to the following
attack.
2) Authentication Server Adversary (A=AS): The follow-
ing attack shows how a malicious authentication server AS
can learn the enrolled biometric template bi corresponding to
some identity IDi. To do so the authentication server AS re-
quests the template bi without revealing IDi and receives from
DB the encrypted template that was stored during enrolment,
i.e., EGM(bi, pk) = 〈EGM(bi,1, pk), . . . , EGM(bi,M , pk)〉.
The attack consists of a bitwise search performed by AS in
the encrypted domain. First AS computes the encryption of a
zero bit EGM(0, pk). If the public key is not known by AS, he
can take an encrypted bit of the template retrieved from DB
and compute EGM(bi,k, pk)0 = EGM(0, pk). Let the maximum
allowed Hamming distance be t.
Now AS will take the first encrypted bit EGM(bi,1, pk),
repeat it t+1 times and add M−t−1 encryptions of a zero bit.
Note that the ciphertext EGM(bi,1, pk) can be re-randomized
so that it is impossible to detect that the duplicate ciphertexts
are “copies”. If bi,1 is one, the total Hamming distance as
computed by M will be t+ 1 and M will return NOK (not
ok). If bi,1 is zero, the M will return OK. This process can
be repeated for all bits of bi, hence, AS can learn bi bit by
bit in M queries. To further disguise the attack AS can apply
permutations and add up to t encryptions of one-bits to make
the query look genuine.
3) Matcher and Sensor Adversary (A=M+S): A bitwise
search attack similar to the previous attack can also be
considered in the case of an adversary made of the matcher
assisted by the sensor. The attack consists of the following
steps:
• S sends the encryption of 0¯ = 〈0, . . . , 0〉 ;
• M receives bi ⊕ 0¯ bitwise but permuted and records the
weight of bi ⊕ 0¯ ;
• S toggles a bit in the 0¯ vector in position x and sends it
to AS;
• M observes the changed weight (+1 or -1) and learns the
bit at position x in bi .
The adversary learns bi in M queries.
4) Discussion: What makes the first attack (A=AS) fea-
sible is that all bits are encrypted separately and that the
cryptosystem is homomorphic and thus f1(b′i) and f2(bi) are
malleable (needed to create the encryption of a zero-bit if the
public key is not known). Moreover, it is not enforced that AS
combines the input from the sensor and from the database.
To counteract this threat, one could require S to sign the
input and force DB to merge the input with references, in
this way DB combines the sample and the reference and AS
does not receive the reference EGM(bi, pk) but the combination
of the sample EGM(b′i ⊕ bi, pk). Using the previous attack,
however, AS can still learn b′i and the b′i ⊕ bi. Additional
measures have to be taken to prevent this, e.g., DB could be
required to sign EGM(b′i ⊕ bi, pk), which will be verified by
M. Note that in the case where AS and DB collude, these
countermeasures are not sufficient anymore.
B. Barbosa et al. ACISP 2008
1) Description: In [20] Barbosa et al. presented a new pro-
tocol for biometric authentication, following [19] (see previous
Section III-A). A notable difference between these two comes
from the fact that [19] compares two biometric templates by
their Hamming distance, enabling biometric authentication,
whereas [20] classifies one biometric template into different
classes thanks to the SVM classifier (support vector machine,
see [29] for details) leading to biometric identification. Bio-
metric templates are represented as features vector where
each feature is an integer, i.e., bi = 〈bi,1, . . . , bi,k〉 ∈ Nk.
Barbosa et al. encrypt this vector, feature by feature, with
the Paillier cryptosystem [30]. In particular, they exploit its
homomorphism property to compute its SVM classifier (think
of a sum of scalar products) in the encrypted domain.
However, as we explain further below in this section, as
the features are encrypted one by one, an adversary can do
something similar as the attack described in the previous
section (Section III-A).
Let EPaillier (resp. DPaillier) denote the encryption (resp.
decryption) with Paillier’s cryptosystem. This cryptosystem
enjoys a homomorphic property which ensures that the product
of two encrypted texts corresponds to the encryption of their
sum: for m1,m2 ∈ Zn we have that DPailler(EPailler(m1) ×
EPailler(m2)) = m1+m2 mod n . Note that Zn is the plaintext
space of the Paillier cryptosystem.
The SVM classifier takes as input U classes (or users)
and S samples per class, and determines support vectors
SVi,j and weights αi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ S and 1 ≤ j ≤ U .
Following the notation in [20], let v = (v1, . . . , vk) = bi
denote a freshly captured biometric sample. For this sample
6the classifier computes
cl
(j)
SVM(v) =
S∑
i=1
αi,j
k∑
l=1
vl(SVi,j)l for j = 1, . . . , U . (7)
With this vector clSVM(v), it is possible to determine which
class is the most likely for v or to reject it. The support vectors
SVi,j and the weight coefficients αi,j are the references that
are stored by DB.
Briefly, the scheme of Barbosa et al. works as follows:
1) The sensor S captures a fresh biometric sample and
encrypts each of the features of its template v =
(v1, . . . , vk) with Paillier’s cryptosystem and sends
it to the authentication server AS . Let auth =
(EPaillier(v1), . . . , EPaillier(vk)).
2) The database DB computes an encrypted version of
the SVM classifier for this biometric data: cj =∏S
i=1(
∏k
l=1[authj ]
[SVi,j ]l
l )
αi,j where [.]l denotes the
lth component of a tuple. This cj corresponds to the
encryption of the cl(j)SVM with Paillier’s cryptosystem as
defined above. The database returns the values cj to AS.
3) The authentication server AS scrambles the values cj
and forwards them to M.1.
4) The matcher M, using the private key of the system,
decrypts the components of the SVM classifier and per-
forms the classification of v. The classification returns
the class for which the value cl(j)SVM is maximal.
5) Based on the output of M, AS determines the real
identity of Ui (in case of non-rejection).
2) Authentication Server Adversary (A=AS): The fol-
lowing attack shows how a malicious AS can recover the
biometric references. In this scheme, the biometric reference
data that are stored by DB, i.e., the support vectors SVi,j
and the weight coefficients αi,j , represent hyperplanes that are
used for classification. These k-dimensional hyperplanes are
expressed as linear combinations of enrolment samples (the
support vectors). We will show how these hyperplanes can be
recovered dimension by dimension.
Let us rewrite (7) as
cl
(j)
SVM(v) = v1
S∑
i=1
αi,j(SVi,j)1 + · · ·+ vk
S∑
i=1
αi,j(SVi,j)k
= v1βj,1 + · · ·+ vkβj,k .
By sending a vector v = 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉 to DB, AS will retrieve
the encryption of βj,1 =
∑S
i=1 αi,j(SVi,j)1 for each user,
indexed by j, in the database.
Instead of sending all cj = EPaillier(βj,1) to M, only one
value will be kept by AS , e.g., c1 = EPaillier(β1,1). The
authentication server will set c2 = EPaillier(x) for some value
x ∈ Zn and all other cj = EPaillier(0). The matcher M will
return the index of the class with the greatest value, which is
1 if β1,1 > x and 2 if β1,1 < x.
The initial value of x = n/2. If β1,1 > x then AS will
adjust x to n/2+n/4, otherwise x = n/2−n/4. By repeating
this process and adjusting the value x, the exact value β1,1 can
1In [20], the entity that makes the decision is refered to as the verification
server. To be consistent with our model we continue to use the term matcher.
be learned after log2 n queries. Hence, the reference data of a
single user can be learned in k log2 n queries to the matcher.
with the permutation). Quite logical, as the matcher is
determining a list of candidates. In particular, although the
identifiers are permuted, he can detect if related inputs are
used, to trace the user whole database (with a known input)
3) Discussion: As in Section III-A this attack succeeds
because features are encrypted separately and there is no check
to see if the sample and the reference were really merged. The
same attack can in principle be used to learn any information
about the input sample.
C. Stoianov SPIE 2010
1) Description: In [22], Stoianov introduces several au-
thentication schemes relying on the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudo-
random generator. We focus on the database setting from the
paper (cf. Section 7 of [22]. In this setting there is a service
provider SP that performs the verification. Consistent with our
model, we will call this entity the matcher M. Sample and
reference are combined before being sent to M and although
this is not explicitly mentioned in [22] we designate this
functionality to the authentication server AS in our model.
In the schemes of [22], the biometric data b are binarized
and are combined with a random codeword c coming from
an error-correcting code to form a secure sketch or code
offset b ⊕ c where ⊕ stands for the exclusive-or (XOR).
When a new capture b′ is made, whenever b′ is close to b
(using the Hamming distance) it is possible to recover c from
b⊕ b′ ⊕ c using error correction. This technique is known as
the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [5].
An additional layer of protection is added by encrypting the
secure sketch using Blum-Goldwasser.
The Blum-Blum-Shub pseudo-random generator [31] is a
tool used in the Blum-Goldwasser asymmetric cryptosystem
[32]. From a seed x0 and a public key, a pseudo-random
sequence S is generated. In the following, S is XOR-ed to
the biometric data to be encrypted. By doing so, the state of
the pseudo-random generator is updated to xt+1. From xt+1
and the private key, the sequence S can be recomputed.
In this system of Stoianov, M generates the keys and sends
the public key to S. On enrollment
1) Sensor S computes (S ⊕ b⊕ c, xt+1) where:
• Sample b is the freshly captured biometric data,
• String S is a pseudo-random sequence and xt+1 is
the state of the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudo-random
generator as described above, and
• c is a random codeword which makes the secure
sketch c⊕ b;
2) Sensor S sends S ⊕ b⊕ c to DB;
3) Sensor S sends xt+1 and H(c) to M where H is a
cryptographic hash function.
Using the private key, M computes S from xt+1 and stores
it along H(c). Periodically, M (resp. DB) updates S (resp.
S ⊕ b⊕ c) to Sˇ (resp. Sˇ ⊕ c⊕ b) with an independent stream
cipher.
During authentication sensor S receives a new sample b′ and
forwards (S′ ⊕ b′, x′t+1) to AS , where S′ is a new pseudo-
random sequence. It is assumed that there is some sort of
7authentication server AS that retrieves Sˇ⊕c⊕b from DB and
merges it with S′ ⊕ b′. Finally S′ ⊕ b′ ⊕ Sˇ ⊕ b ⊕ c and x′t+1
are sent to M. Using the private key M recovers S′. From S′
and Sˇ, M computes c⊕ b⊕ b′, tries to decode it and verifies
the consistency of the result with H(c).
2) Matcher Adversary (A=M): Let M be the primary
attacker. It is inherent to the scheme that M can always trace a
valid user over different queries by looking at the codeword c,
which is revealed after a successful authentication. Depending
on the entity that colludes with M additional attacks can be
deviced.
If M and DB collude (A=M+DB) they learn the sketch
c⊕ b. This implies that they can immediately trace users with
different identities following the linkability attack based on
the decoding of the sum of two sketches as described in [11].
From a genuine match, M learns c and thus also b.
If M and S collude (A=M+S) they control and always
learn the input sample b′. By setting b′ = 0 they learn c ⊕ b
from a single query. If a successful authentication occurred,
the adversary learns everything.
If M and AS collude (A=M+AS) they always learn the
input sample b′. They can learn the sketch c ⊕ b for any
reference and thus trace users with different identities as in the
case (A=M+DB). They learn the reference b after successful
authentication.
exhaustive search block by block in case of an accept to
reconstruct b + b’...
3) Authentication Server Adversary (A=AS): In the cur-
rent scheme, bits are not encrypted bit per bit independently.
Moreover, they are masked with streams generated via Blum-
Blum-Shub and a codeword so attacks as in Sections III-A
and III-B are no longer possible. Nevertheless, there is still a
binary structure that AS may exploit.
Assume that AS knows S′ ⊕ b′ that leads to a positive
decision, i.e., M accepts b′ because d(b, b′) ≤ t . Then AS
can start from S′⊕ b′ and add progressively some errors until
he reaches a negative result. Then, he backtracks one step by
decreasing the error weight by one to come back to the last
positive result. This gives AS an encrypted template S′⊕ b′′.
Consider now the vector S′ ⊕ b′′ ⊕ Sˇ ⊕ c⊕ b and replace the
first bits (say of small length l) by a l bits vector x.
• For all possible values of x, AS sends the resulting vector
(the first block is changed by the value x) to M who acts
as a decision oracle.
• If several values give a positive result, then AS increases
the errors on all but the first block.
• This is repeated until only one value of x gives a positive
result.
• When this step is reached, AS has found the value x with
no errors, i.e., he learns the first block of S′ ⊕ Sˇ ⊕ c.
• AS proceeds to the next block.
Following this strategy, it is feasible to recover all the bits of
b⊕b′. If AS colludes with S, he can retrieve the full reference
template b as soon as S knows one sample that is close to b.
We call this attack a center search (cf. Section IV below).
4) Discussion: In a way similar to the inherent traceability
of users by M, there are no mechanisms described that protect
against the database tracing users over different queries, i.e.,
by tracking Sˇ + c+ b lookups.
We note that the matcher M is very powerful because he
knows the secret key, which allows computing S′, and Sˇ. As
soon as M colludes with one of the other entities he is able
to learn everything from a genuine match or a false accept.
D. Other Schemes
Due to the generic design of our model, several other
schemes in the literature fit our model. Nevertheless, as they
are not always designed with the same entities, an adaptation
might be required. Some others are not compatible at all; for
instance those for which the security relies on a user-secret
key stored on the user side. We now present a brief overview
of the schemes [23], [24] when analyzed in our model.
ACM MMSec 2010 eSketch: This scheme of Failla et
al. is described in [23] following a client-server model. The
client corresponds to AS and the server can be logically
separated into DB and M. The goal of the scheme is to
provide anonymous identification. The DB stores data derived
from the biometric reference, in particular secure sketches, and
part of the data is encrypted via the Paillier cryptosystem with
the corresponding secret key owned by AS . The identification
query is implemented through different exchanges between the
entities and at one step the same randomness is used to mask
all the different reference templates and the masked values are
sent to AS . Consequently, an authentication server adversary
(A = AS) learns the whole database after one successful
authentication, because the client (AS in our model) knows the
Paillier secret keys. If the adversary consists of the database
and the matcher (A = DB + M), it is also possible to learn
the reference template, which is supposed to be hidden for the
server.
ACM MMSec 2010 Secure Multiparty Computation: This
scheme of Raimondo et al. [24] is also described following
a client-server model with secure multiparty computation
between them to achieve an identification scenario (authen-
tication scenario as well, cf. [24, Fig. 3]). The scheme is
not made to be resistant against malicious adversaries. Fitting
it in our model, we have AS which obtains the result and
DB which stores all the references in clear; AS sends an
encrypted (via Paillier) query to DB; DB sends back to AS
all the entries combined with the query (this gives in fact a
database containing all the Euclidean distances) and then AS
and M interact (secure multiparty protocol) to output the list
of identifiers for which the distance is below a threshold. Here
again encryption of the query is made block by block, so a
similar strategy as in Section III-B is possible when A = AS .
An adversary A = DB + M can also tamper the inputs to the
last part of the protocol to learn information about the query.
IV. FORMALIZATION OF ATTACK SCENARIOS
The goal of this section is to explore some generic attack
scenarios that can be used for analyzing actual protocol
specifications. These attacks are presented in the framework
as described in Section II and generalize the attacks of the
previous Section III. As explained in Section II we only
8consider malicious internal attackers, i.e., AS , DB, M and
combinations of these entities. User Ui and the sensor S have
been excluded as individual attackers.
A. Blackbox Attack Model
The different attacks that can be carried out by the attackers
are modeled as blackbox attacks, following recent results
from [25]. This allows us to clearly specify the focus of
the attack. Our blackbox-attack model consists of two logical
entities:
1) The attacker, i.e., one or more system entities. These
entities are fully under control of the attacker: internal
data are known, messages can be modified and addi-
tional transactions can be generated.
2) The target or the blackbox, i.e., the combination of all
other system entities. The attack is focused on the data
that are protected by the system components within the
blackbox.
The target is modeled as a blackbox because the attacker
can only observe the input-output behavior of the box. This
adequately reflects remote protocols where only the communi-
cation can be seen by the attacker. No details are known about
the internal state of the remote components. During the attack,
the attacker will “tweak” inputs to the blackbox. However, all
communication must comply with the protocol specification.
Any messages that are malformed or that are sent in the wrong
order are rejected by the blackbox.
It should be noted that there are cases in which the attacker
cannot generate additional transactions because he has to
follow the protocol specifications. E.g., if DB is attacking
he has to wait until a request is received from AS . When
analyzing protocols it should be assumed that this will occur
with a reasonable frequency. If relevant, attack complexity can
be expressed in function of this frequency. Similarly, if the
attacker is AS , he receives inputs from S and communicates
with DB and M. In this case we exclude Ui and S from
the blackbox. It should be assumed, though, that a number of
inputs from S is available to AS . This does not necessarily
imply that S is under control of AS . The analysis of the attack
can take into account the amount of data that is available.
We will now consider a number of possible adversaries and
blackbox attacks in our framework.
B. Attacker = AS
Decomposed Reference Attack: Let’s assume that only
one reference bi is returned by DB. The goal of this attack
is to learn bi. Biometric samples or references are often
represented as a “string”, i.e., a concatenation (let ‖ denote
concatenation) of (binary) symbols. Let’s assume that f2(bi)
is the concatenation of a subfunction fˆ2 that is applied on
each of the n components b′i,j of b′i individually. If AS has to
combine f2(bi) and f1(b′i) without knowing either the sample
or the reference, it is likely that f1 and f3 will also be the
concatenation of component-wise applied subfunctions, i.e.,
f3(bi, b
′
i) = fˆ3(bi,1, b
′
i,1)‖ . . . ‖fˆ3(bi,n, b
′
i,n). Note that in our
model AS can generate the value fˆ3(bi,j , b′i,j) but this value
should not reveal to AS whether the inputs are the same or
not. This decomposition of references is used in the scheme
analyzed in Section III-A and the following attack applies to
it.
Suppose that AS is able to generate a value that is valid
output of fˆ3 when the two component inputs bi,j and b′i,j
are the same and similarly when they are not the same, e.g.,
the output is the encryption of one or zero. If AS can also
compute f1, then AS can fully reconstruct bi. To do so AS
choose the first component of b′i at random, combines it with
the first component of bi and sends the result to M. The other
components that are sent to M are such that t of those are
an output of fˆ3 that reflects different inputs and the n− t− 1
remaining components are outputs that reflect equal inputs.
Note that t is the comparison threshold. If the guess of AS
for the first component is correct then M will return a positive
match. Otherwise the guess is wrong and AS can try again.
This process can be repeated until all components of bi are
recovered. For binary samples, this requires n queries to M
and 1 query to DB.
As shown in Section III-B a similar attack can be executed
if the biometric data are represented as real-valued or integer-
valued feature vectors. However, more queries might be re-
quired to get an accurate result.
Center Search Attack Using S: In this attack, S is also
compromised and under the control of the attacker. The attack
goal is to learn the full reference bi from a close sample. The
input sample is obviously always known to AS and S. Thus
at some point in time Ui will present a sample b′i that matches
reference bi. This sample will lie at some distance from the
reference. In the case where biometrics are represented as
binary strings and the system implements a hamming distance
matcher the attacker can recover the exact bi as follows.
The sensor flips the first bit of b′i and sends the new sample
to AS who performs the whole authentication procedure. If
the authentication succeeds S flips the second bit, leaving the
first bit also flipped, and sends the sample to AS who follows
the procedure again. This continues until the sample no longer
matches bi. Then the sensor starts again by restoring the first
bit of the sample that is no longer accepted and forwards it
to AS . If it gets accepted this means that the first bit of the
original sample b′i was the same as the first bit of bi. If not,
then the first bits were different. One by one the bits in b′i that
are different from those in bi can be corrected. This technique
was demonstrated in Section III-C.
We call this the center search attack because we start from
a sample that lies in a sphere with radius t, the matching
threshold, and the reference as center point. The goal of this
attack is to move the sample to the center of the sphere. The
worst-case complexity of this attack for bitstrings of length n
is the greatest of 2 ∗ t+n and 4t. The complexity is 2 ∗ t+n
if there are t−1 bit-errors in the beginning and one at the end
of the string. The first t − 1 errors get corrected by flipping
them and t additional bits need to be flipped to invalidate the
sample. Locating the bit-errors requires searching till the end
of the string where the last error is. The complexity is 4t if
there are t − 1 correct bits followed by t wrong bits. So 2t
flips are needed before the queries no longer match and then
92t positions need to be searched. In practice, t ≤ n/2 and
thus the worst-case complexity is 2t+ n.
False-Acceptance-Rate Attack: A false acceptance occurs
if a sample, not coming from Ui, is close enough to bi to
be recognized by the system as a sample coming from Ui.
The name comes from the fact that an attacker can take a
large existing database of samples and feed that to a biometric
authentication system. Due to the inherent false acceptance
rates, there will be a sample in the attacker’s database that
matches the reference in the system with high probability.
The goal of this attack is to learn bi from a matching sample
that is unknown to the attacker. This attack combines ideas
from the previous attacks. The attacker is AS, not including
S, and AS does not know how to compute an output of f3
that reflects equal (or different) inputs. It is assumed, however,
that the attacker can replace the components of b′i in the value
he received from S, i.e., f1(b′i). This is definitely the case if
f1 is a concatenation of subfunctions and if AS can compute
such subfunction fˆ1.
The actual attack then proceeds as follow. The attacker AS
waits until a genuine user presents a valid sample. The attack
is similar as in the center-search attack, only now AS will
not flip bits but simply replace them with a known value, e.g.,
one. He will do this until the sample no longer matches. Then
AS already knows that the last bit he replaced was not one
and he will restore that bit. Then he continues to substitute the
bits one by, carefully observing whether the sample matches
or not and learning all the bits. The first bits that were flip to
invalidate the sample can be learned by simply restoring them.
C. Attacker = DB or M
The attacker is the database DB or the matcher M who
communicate with the authentication service AS only. The
attackers cannot achieve any of the attack goals individually
because their blackboxes give output, which cannot be influ-
enced by the attacker, before receiving input. If these entities
do not collude with other entities they are simply passive
attackers and by Assumption 2 they cannot mount any attacks.
Including the sensor S: If the sensor colludes with the
database or the matcher, some attacks are trivial: the provided
sample is known and thus it is also easy to trace a user based
on the provided sample or identity.
A powerful attacker is the combination of the M and the S,
as was shown in Section III-C. Because the sensor can send
any input and any identity, the attacker does not have to wait
for a matching sample. The same center-search attack can be
performed as in the case where AS and S are the attacker.
D. Attacker = AS and DB
The attackers (AS and DB) receive fresh input from S and
communicate with the matcher. They can search the entire
database and turn to identification although the protocol could
be designed to operate in verification mode.
The input sample b′i can be learned in the same way as the
bi was learned in the attacks of AS , if the same conditions
hold. Then, depending on the implementation, the attacker can
learn the entire database because DB will return any bi and
AS will manipulate it until all bits are known.
E. Attacker = AS and M
The attack goal with the highest impact is to learn the
reference bi from the database. Depending on how the M
implements its functionality this can be a very powerful
attacker, e.g., if M possesses decryption keys for encrypted
samples/templates as was the case in the schemes analyzed in
Sections III-A, III-B and III-C.
F. Attacker = DB and M
In this combination of attackers, DB will manipulate its
output so that it can be of use to the M. The relevant attack
goals are to learn b′i and to trace Ui.
G. Attacker = AS and DB and M
In this particular case, the attacker is a combination of AS ,
DB and M, and the goal is to learn b′i. If the reference bi
is not stored in the clear by the database, the attacker may
want to learn bi also. Tracing Ui is almost trivial because the
attacker can perform a search (identification) on the database
DB. The attack goals are easily reached if the data can be
decomposed as explained in the attacks of AS.
V. CONCLUSION
Biometric authentication protocols that are found in the
literature are usually designed in the honest-but-curious model
assuming that there are no malicious insider adversaries. In
this paper, we have challenged that assumption and shown
how some existing protocols are not secure against such
adversaries. Such analysis is extremely relevant in the context
of independent database providers. Much attention was given
to an authentication server attacker, which is a central and
powerful entity in our model. To prevent the attacks that
were presented, stronger enforcement of the protocol design
is needed: many attacks succeed because transactions can be
duplicated or manipulated.
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